

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

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27 May 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

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Acting National Intelligence Officer for Europe

SUBJECT: May Warning and Forecast Report

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I. MAIN DISCUSSION ITEMSA. Turkey and the Gulf War

1. Discussion. Kurdish minorities in Turkey and Iraq pose problems for both governments. Coping with the Kurdish insurgency -- a chronic threat to Iraqi stability -- forces Iraq to divert military resources from the war with Iran.

At the same time, Iranian support for Iraq's Kurdish insurgency is increasingly posing a threat to Turkey as well. Although there does not appear to be an imminent danger to Turkish internal stability or territorial integrity, Ankara is faced with new challenges in dealing with its Middle Eastern neighbors and countering the growing external support for the Kurdish insurgency within Turkey.

While officially proclaiming neutrality, Turkey has tilted toward Baghdad in the Gulf War.

- Baghdad and Ankara agreed in 1984 to allow Turkish forces to pursue Kurds across the border into Iraq.
- Turkey has warned Iran not to disrupt vital oil supplies from Iraq's oil fields.
- Turkey is worried about the spread of Moslem fundamentalism should Iran defeat Iraq.

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The outlook is for Iraq's war against the Kurdish insurgents to escalate. Iran is likely to step up joint operations with the Kurds, and Baghdad seems determined to maintain control of them. Turkey's position is more ambivalent: Ozal is under domestic pressure to take firm action against the Kurds but is also concerned about Turkey's international image. Turkey's unusual failure to retaliate for a Kurdish ambush in April may indicate a hesitancy to take steps that would interfere with its application to the EC.

2. Warning Notice. Turkey's interests in the Gulf War increasingly are on Iraq's side against Iran. Ankara would be a reluctant combatant and reportedly has no military contingency plans for entering the Gulf War. Major Iranian successes would raise the stakes, however, and the warnings to Iran about disrupting the oil pipeline from Iraq should be taken seriously. The shared antipathy with Iraq against the Kurds adds further weight to Turkey's tilt toward Iraq -- a tilt which might become more pronounced if the Kurds make military gains which threaten Iraq's territorial integrity or the Kirkuk oilfields.

Turkey's relations with Syria are also strained. While both sides have taken steps to avoid direct confrontation, further Syrian support for Kurdish raids into Turkey would heighten pressure on Ankara for cross-border retaliation.

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B. The Security Debate in Europe

1. Discussion. Allied attitudes toward LRINF/SRINF are still evolving, and public positions continue to diverge from those privately expressed in Paris, London, and Bonn. Mrs. Thatcher has hedged her bets on O-O SRINF, and Chirac has reluctantly aligned himself with Mitterand in

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supporting a double-zero solution. Both positions could be altered by the ongoing debate in Bonn, where the coalition remains deeply divided over the preferred SRINF outcome. Underlying all these positions is concern over flexible response, the "denuclearization of Europe," and ultimately, the reliability of the US security commitment.

Beyond LRINF/SRINF, there is a set of potentially divisive issues looming, particularly in the FRG.

- Worried that Germany may become the nuclear battleground of Europe, Bonn is pressing for follow-on reductions of tactical nuclear weapons down to 150 km -- a position strongly opposed by the British and French.

- At the same time, Chancellor Kohl is under tremendous domestic pressure -- from his coalition partners, opposition parties, and the population at large -- to acquiesce to a sweeping INF accord.

Shared West European concerns over US-Soviet arms negotiations have contributed to growing intra-European security policy coordination, and the British in particular have claimed credit for walking the US back from the Reykjavik grand package. But further intra-European collaboration will be impeded by the sharpening divisions over battlefield nuclear weapons, the British and French nuclear arsenals, and conventional force reductions, as well as by enduring disparities in fundamental security orientations.

- The US-UK special relationship spawns ambivalence in London and inhibits British enthusiasm for intra-European cooperation.
- Commitment to an independent defense posture limits French maneuverability in promoting a separate "European security charter" -- despite France's lobbying within the WEU.
- West German preoccupation with Ostpolitik and intra-German relations divides the FRG from its allies on key security issues affecting central Europe.

2. Warning Notice. Despite outward professions of solidarity, West European security postures remain in flux, their future evolution contingent on US actions, Soviet moves, and mounting domestic pressures.

- The French and British in particular will be watching closely for signs that we may be prepared to strike a deal for reductions in tactical nuclear weapons.

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-- And the Soviets will continue their efforts to put us in a defensive and reactive posture by offering a steady stream of new initiatives aimed at Europe.

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